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linear. Let
f(s) = As + B
•~k
\: (!.k) = L ~i X ki + bk '
i=l
then the solution of the optimization pr~blem (27) is a
piece-wise linear' function Qk • In this case the reduced game
can be solved easily as i t is shown in [lOJ, pp. 43-44 •
•5. Multiproduct oligopoly game
In this paragraph we will consider the game having the
sets of strategies
~ = [o, ~CLlJ
end pa.y-off functions
x ••• x (30 )
n
L xP) ,••• ,
{,=l
(31)
where (
ll) lM))~ = Xk '···'Xk '
n n
9 Cfm) = 0, L ri-1) x ••• x 0, L: LiMl , R(fm)CRl for
t=l e=1
k=1,2 •••• ,n and 1Il=1 , 2, •• , M. This game can come up if the
factories manufacture differ~nt p~ducts and sell them on the
same market. Let M be the number of products, and 1et x~m) ,
~) be the p~duction level and capacity limit of factory k
f~m p~duct m. If f donotes the unit price of p~duct m, than
m
it is assumed that f is a function of the total production
m
levels of the different products. The function y~ is tbe
- J2 -
an~ ~3lng tn~ aOOV6 _erminology tne incorne
V~ fa." .ory k ..... oJ.ven oy function (Jl).
3imilar lnterprètation c~~ be given to the other applications
sh~/~ ~ the section àealing with the classical oligopoly game
but ìiffe=ent aualities of water ~~d waste-water have to be
•
introduceci.
':"..e :'ollc.'I(ing ~sul t is basic in the theory of mul tiproàuct
econo~es, acd it is a generalization of par~ cl in the proof
of Theorem 4.
are concave and
,
Lemma 11., Let g, be a vector'-vector' function such that
rv:
of Rb(~) is a convex set in the nonnegative orthant
M7I,l~IC R • Assume that the components of g,
continuously differentiable. Let J
-
-
be the Jacobian matrix
of g. Ii !I
-
~ ~ .9(~I,
'!'(~) + II l~)- is nonnegative semidefinite for arbitrary
then the function
h(~) = ~T gl~)
lS concave.
(J2)
FroofL Let \J denote the gradient operation. Then simple
calculations show that
T TV h(~) = g ~) + ~ II (~) •
Since the components of g, are concave, we have
(JJ)
and the condition given for the Jacobian J
-
-
implies
- )) -
'"
- (ii. - ~l· ~(~)(;y - ~).
(34 )
The ~nequalities (3)) ,(34) •ana imply
'"l- {g(iL) - gl~\} ~
consequently
- ~ l,
wh::.cÌ! and equation ()2) c·~veo the inequality
Thus function h is concave.
As a corollary to this general r~sult we can prove the
main resul t of this see H '1n.
•
'lheorem 7..!. :'et and let J
-
-
oe t!le
Jacobian of f. Assume that fune tions f and ~ (l ::.. k ~ !l) are
continuous)the components of f are continuously differentiable
and concave, ~ is convex and for arbitrary ~ ~ ~(f) tr-e
T
+ ~t~) is nonnegative semidefinite. Then the
game has at least one equilibrium point.
Preof. Since ~ ~s a closed, convex, boundeQ subset of
concave in ~k' the game satisfies all conditions
NikaiQo-Isoda theorem. Thus the game has at least
equilibrium point.
•
'f k ~s continuous and Lemma 11. implies that , o ~s'k
of the
one
•
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Remark. The theorem does not g~ve numerical methods for
the determination of the equilibrium point. But in the linear
case a very efficient algorithm can be constructed which is a
"generalization of the method of M. Manas given for the one-
-product case.
Let us assume that
'. ( (l) (M))I,.u. S ,,, •• ,8
ML ~m) x~m) + Bk
m=l
N;
= La~m)
m=l
(k=1,2, ••• ,n),
where (m)s
n
, (m)
- L xk •
k=l
1et us intr'Oduce the
following notations: ~(m)
Finally let us assume that
n
= L~m)
k=l
A + AT
- -
- -
(
l.m)~M
, fl. = al.. -l .
-,U. "" , m-
is nonnegative semidefinite.
Under the above condi tions the game has at least one equilibrium
point, and since
H (H ii)!. = !l'···'!n
only if
•
'f k is concave in ~k' a vec toro
is an equilibrium point of the game if and
/' O for (m) ft - O
-
xk-
-
Cl fk(~ii)
> O for lffi)ii ~m) (~ k,m) (35)él x Cm) xk ----
k
- O for O < x~m)ft < ~m)
-
,
•
here ii (Uht (Mllt)~ = \xk , ••• ,xk ( k= l , 2 , ••• , n). Le t
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Wl ::> O
- X,K =
/ , . , x'Y-' (\ (36 )I v " . '>- ... ~V') k •)z,
K \
I ~ - otherwisev--
\..
• ..; ..;' xV-) ..- • (t<)
-
v
-. ~V·l , k ---Iv,
e
Il;
:> o otherwise,
-
then oy calculating the partial derivatives of -t k 'N e can
easily verify that the conditions (35) are equivalent to the
set of equations (see [lO] pp. 46-47)
b,u. + + zrl - O (37)
for J-l-=1,2, ••• ,M; k=1,2, ••• ,n , where
n
slw) = L x~m).
k=l
The above system can be written ~n a simpler form if we
introduce the following notations:
"'~ = ( xpl , ••• ,x~M) , ••• ,x~l), •••• ,x~M)r
a = ( III CM) (l) (Ml)T
_ Al' ••• , Al t ••• t An , •••• , An
"'( \.Il (M) (l) CM)) •! = vI'···' vI'···' vn , ••• , vn
(38 )
_ ( ll)~ - zl' ... , (MI2 1 t···'
(l)
zn , ••• ,
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Y:. = ( w?\ t ',l) ll) W~M) ) T... , Wl • ... , wn , ••• t
-
. ll) '1'[M) III L(M) ) ~
.{,
- l Lì ,••• , Ll • ... , Ln ', ••• ,- n
( bI' ••• t t'M' ••• ' 11 •••• , bM )
T
o -
-
-
;x.
Ful"thermore let P denote the Mn x Mn matl"ix
-
-
I • ATA A • \I ••• I
-
- - - •
•p • + • •- • •
- •
r
• '1'A
•••
A A~
- -
- - -
then the relations (36). (37), (38) have the forrr:
r x + b - a - v T Z = O
-- - - - - -
Z + W - ~-
- -
T T T Ox Z v W - V Z
- - -
- - - - - -
(39)
x, v, Z, w
- - - -
:::, O •
- -
-
Thus we have proven the following r'esul1;.
Lemma 12•. A vector ::.s an equilibrium point , .'01 tl1e
linear oligopoly game with nonnegative definite
* Ji *if and only if there exist vector's :!., Y!. , ~
matrix A. +
-
-
such 1;hat
T,
r.
-
conditions (39) are satisfied with ii~=!.,y.= Jt iiV • W = W
- - -
and z = z* •
- -
In a furthel" special case the uruqueness of the equilibl"iu:n
point is assured, as it is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Assume that matrix A is symmetric, negative
-
definite. Then the game has a unique e qui li brium poir.t.
Proof., Let us consider the quadratic :programnung problem
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o , x ~ I:
- (4 0 )
- -
-
-- -
-,
x
T rn
- p (~ ,. max~ x - - al y. >- •
-
-
- - --
P::-rs t we pr-ove tha <: problem (4 O) i s astri:; t::' -,- :; onvex
-
progI'a.mJJUng problen:. h is sufficient tO prove tilat n:atrix !'
-
,-
'f" - ( )L!R,·m~s ne(;at~ve ue =~te • .uet ~ = l:!1' ••••1!.n ~ , 'Nhere
for k=1.2 ••••• n. Then
~ r: ~_.
--
~ L T L In• "- ,1,;, p 1,;, - ti " l:!k + 1;.~ A u.- n I -
-
-
- =k - -~ - -"- - - v
k=l i-l j-l
-- --
n I n
,
n, rn
L T i ~ - L,- u, A u + I u, A u_ < \)-K - -k -~ -,- - v
k-' i-l j-l-,!,
-- --
for u i- O. 1:-
- -
.
"-
~s symmetric, then obviously f ~s ..a..so
symmetric.
llext we ODserve that conùitions (39) without equat~on
':f..T ~ = O are the Kuhn-Tucker condi tions of che quadratic
progr~ng problem (see G. Hadley (31). and since it is
convex. the Kuhn-Tucker condi tions ar'e necessary and sufficient
conàitions for tile optimality. The fact that the matrix
negative ùefini te implies that problem (40) ilas a unique
p
-
-
~s
•
solution. and since the game has an equilibrium point whicn
must satisfy system D9) we conclude that the unique solution
of (40) gives the ~que solution of (39). which is the ~que
equilibrium point of the game.
Remark. The numerical solution of problem (40)
obtained by standard methods (see G. Hadley (31).
can De
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Fina.l1y we remark that the statements of Lemma 12. and
Theorem 8. can be extended for the multiproduct group equi1ibrium
prob1em, but the detai1s ar'e not discussed here.
